For Washington’s Interests, Understanding Riyadh is Vital

Written: February 2013

  Over all of the pervasive Middle East themes that make news in the United States – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, petroleum pricing, stopping terrorist attacks – there are two topics that are dominating today’s media headlines: the crisis in Syria and nuclear discussions with Iran. To the American people, the issues are separate: one is a humanitarian catastrophe and the other, a chance to finally reconcile a protracted security challenge. It is critically important that American policymakers do not make the same superficial distinction, however, if they hope to produce effective outcomes in the ongoing negotiations. In particular, special attention must be paid to fully understanding the geostrategic goals of Saudi Arabia, since it is the country that is in the greatest position to leverage American interests in the region.

For the past 60 years, Saudi Arabia has been one of the United States’ most significant economic and political partners in the Middle East, helping to control extremism, undermine Soviet expansionism, and of course, contribute vast quantities of oil to world markets. The reality of Saudi sectarianism has always posed a unique relationship with the United States, one that is highly profitable, if uncomfortable at times. American diplomats have had to balance their declarations of promoting freedom and democracy while simultaneously aligning themselves with the hugely repressive Saudi government. Though the United States and Saudi Arabia have the same goals- bringing down al-Assad and stopping Iran’s nuclear ambitions- each nation’s priorities are vastly different. While Washington resolutely focuses on hunting global terrorism, the Al Saud family fixates on stopping the spread of Iranian influence at all costs.

As the guardian of Islam’s holiest shrines and the leader of the Sunni Islamic ummah, Riyadh has done everything in its power to prevent the rise of rival Shiite power, which they believe is creeping outward from Tehran. Because Shiite influence is tied tightly to al-Assad’s Alawite government- for Saudis, the Syrian crisis is simply a proxy war to fight the real enemy: Iran. When overwhelming election results to institute a moderate-leaning president in Iran last summer was met with the possibility of rapprochement with Washington, it quickly sparked anger in Riyadh. Saudi displeasure with America was made clear last fall, when the kingdom gave up its seat at the UN Security Council in protest to America’s failure to stop the al-Assad regime. However, for Saudi Arabia’s Sunni-controlled monarchy, the topics of non-proliferation in the Gulf and the crimes of Bashar al-Assad really boil down to the same thing: fighting the influence of Iran’s Shiite-led theocracy. In the coming months, America cannot afford to dismiss Saudi Arabia’s motivations because no positive outcome will be possible without their cooperation. Washington must employ an attitude that engages Tehran while also showing appreciation for Riyadh’s security fears. A clear understanding of Saudi Arabia’s true intentions will therefore be crucial if Washington hopes to achieve its current goals in the Middle East.